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social advances" is stressed as of great importa11ce m combating 
these destructive influences. 
The fact that juv.enile crime has increased fifty per cent in Eng-
land since the war is cited as evidence of this lapse in social control 
and the author warns that the United States must take action if it 
is "to avoid the mistakes which England has made" in handling this 
and similar problems. 
Finally the effects of war upon the psychological needs of the 
individual are briefly considered. Of these, the inculcation of fear 
and insecurity, the denial of normal contacts and affection, and the 
limitation of satisfying achievement are viewed as of particular con-
cern. 
It is concluded that there is no single approach to the problem 
of strengthening the personality of youth but that all the factors of 
the life situation must be considered. 
MORALE IN WARTIME 
D. s. BRAINARD 
State Teachers College, St. Cloud 
The responsibility for the maintenance of national morale in 
times of war rests partly on the government and partly on the 
people. For the purposes of this discussion, we might include in this 
second group everyone who does not occupy a position of official 
responsibility. We are, however, most interested in those citizens 
who are sufficiently prominent that anything they may say or do 
.will carry weight. In this group will be found radio commentators, 
editorial writers, people who make up the headlines in newspapers, 
college professors, clergymen, lawyers, and lecturers of all kinds. We 
should also include corporation executives, labor leaders and others 
who can on occasion quiet the fears of the people or arouse them to 
a~tion, wise or otherwise. However, we may err in placing emphasis 
on the more vocal social groups. Sometimes the masses have an un-
canny way of sensing where their own true interests lie and then 
pu·rsuing those interests despite press, pulpit and platform. 
During a great war, it is important to maintain among the 
people full confidence in the good intentions, character, and wis-
dom of the government. This should not, however, necessarily be a 
blind, uncritical confidence. The criticism should always be present, 
but it must be of a constructive nature aimed to improve rather 
than to undermine our position, animated by a keen desire to fur-
ther the ultimate general welfare of all concerned, and determined 
to bripg support to the government when needed. One of the great 
dangers in time of crisis undoubtedly is the mistake of regarding 
any criticism as objectionable. Often essential changes involving the 
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displacement of incompetent, dilatory or shortsighted officials or the 
remedy of serious _situations become possible only as a result of 
pressure of aroused opinion. 
An important aspect of popular morale should be the determina-
tion of those who voice the popular wishes to put an end to con-
flicts of interest between pressure groups. Undertakings of great 
national concern must not be blocked because vested interests 
either of labor or of capital are temporarily or permanently endan-
gered. For example, delays have occurred in the construction of 
land transportation facilities connecting the United States with 
Alaska - facilities which should have been begun as soon as the 
present crisis became acute. These delays have been due in consid-
erable part at least to the opposition of other transportation facili-
ties which will be or believe that they will be adversely affected. 
Only pressure of public opinion can remedy such conditions because 
representatives of such pressure groups frequently occupy key posi-
tions in the government. 
Leaders of opinion should be on the watch to prevent the devel-
opment of forces or movements which might affect adversely the 
attitudes of any considerable group, especially minority groups. A 
good illustration of this sort of thing can be drawn from the first 
Great War. Public condemnation then was drawn in particular to-
ward two groups. One consisted of critics of the existing social and 
economic order popularly grouped together as Reds. The other was 
the negro. As an aftermath of the war, then, we had racial acts 
involving in some cases the lynching of negroes. A hysterical hunt 
for Reds also took place, and the repercussions of the Tom Mooney 
trial have scarcely died down in our own day. The State of ·wash-
ington saw rioting of a serious nature. Indeed the aftermath of the 
war was chiefly a crusade to put the Reds in jail, the public rapidly 
losing interest in the Germans as soon as their military power col-
lapsed. Anything that injures minorities or groups that suffer dis-
crimination tends to undermine the morale of the people who are 
discriminated against and casts doubt on the sincerity of professed 
ideals for which the war is being fought. Majorities then must re-
strain themselves in time of war even more than in time of peace. 
On the other hand sentimentalism must not interfere with necessary 
control of possible fifth columnists. For example, observe the pro-
tests now being raised in certain quarters to the policies of the 
F.B.I. and the Army for the control of Japanese residents in Cali-
fornia. Thus, the people must strive for unity by dispensing justice 
to all and they must support, criticise, and stimulate their elected 
represen ta ti ves. 
In wartime the government must bear the greater responsibility 
for maintenance of morale because it controls most of the factors 
which determine or at least greatly influence the development of 
morale, including most sources of information, and what is far 
more important, in considerable degree the procession of events. 
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First among the governmental factors demanding investigation 
must be the conduct of party politics during wartime. An adminis-
tration needs support from among its own partisans. It also needs 
the intelligent and constructive criticism of the opposition. No ad-
ministration should forget, as has on occasion happened, that it 
~hould lead the whole nation and not merely the pai·ty. Neither 
patriotism or morale demands that we follow the administration, 
right or wrong. 
Two changes then should appear in the conduct of ·party poli-
tics in wartime. First, the opposition should abandon obstructive 
or filibustering tactics and all opposition desigr;ied merely to block 
the plans of opponents or to discredit their motives or policies. If 
they would confine themselves to constructive criticism and attacks 
on major blunders or inadequacies, they would render enormous 
service to the country a.nd probably also in the long run further 
their own party purposes. 
The Administration on the other hand must be willing to ap-
point men of outstanding ability to high civil and military com-
mand on the merit basis only with-no regard to past or prospective 
party services. A good example from past history of the correct pol-
icy is to be found in Presid~nt Lincoln's appointment of General 
McClellan to command the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was 
appointed because Lincoln regarded him as an officer of outslanding 
capacity who would create a great Army. President Lincoln ap-
pointed General McClellan in spite of the fact that he was a politi-
cal opponent and a personal critic. On the other hand, in 1917, the 
United States Army possessed an officer with a distinguished repu-
tation in General Leonard Wood. This officer was never appointed 
to an important overseas command, and it was widely believed at 
the time that the only reason was resentment entertained by the 
President or by his advisers over Wood's criticisms of their policies. 
Further, the Administration also should be expected to abandon 
during wartime merely partisan maneuvers whose primary purpose 
is entrenchment in power or to secure offices for supporters and 
party members. The recent speech of the Attorney General in which 
he urged increased exertions for the party violates the principles of 
sound morale. 
The maintenance of morale among the people in wartime in-
volves due attention to proper living conditions among the people. 
Factors involved must include adequate living space, attention to 
environmental conditions affecting health, attention to the food re-
quirements of the people, and emphasis upon environmental factors 
affecting security ,of employment and mental health. Here probably 
the government in wartime must go further along the line of social 
control than has been thought proper in democratic countries. Un-
doubtedly, great emphasis must be laid upon minimum standards 
and also upon maximum standards in order to maintain morale . 
. The people at war expect limitations. Undoubtedly, people will 
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conform wholeheartedly to all reasonable restrictions. If the Great 
War of 1917 furnishes any criteria, it is evident that people are more 
than willing to accept limitations. To maintain morale during a 
long war, the government must do two things. First, it must itself 
abide by the restrictions ,vhich it places upon the people. It cannot 
expect people to go with less sugar and less candy if it permits ex: 
tensive boondoggling and waste on the part of its own employees. 
Secondly, it must suppress racketeering and extensive evasions of 
its regulations on the part of corporations, labor unions, farm or-
ganizations, and individuals with political influence. 
Morale then is not to be confused with mere enthusiasm gen-
erated by parades and spectacles. Neither is it unity of opinion. 
Rather it is a willingness to place the general welfare above selfish 
personal and group interests. 
In wartime the government controls the sources of information. 
It can use this control to maintain morale and to destroy morale. In 
a democracy the people insist on knowing what is going on. People 
are intelligent enough to realize that much information of vital 
strategic nature must he suppressed for days or weeks or even 
months, because otherwise the enemy will be assisted. Under such 
conditions the suppression of information will not undermine mor-
ale. The government must understand, however, that nothing can 
he hid permanently. It must not permit the suppression of informa-
tion merely to cover up the errors of important departments and 
officials. An excellent example of this sort of thing occurred in the 
Great War of 1917. Here the Airplane Production Program was one 
of the great failures of the war. This failure was not only concealed 
but glowing reports had appeared concerning successful airplane 
production. The true situation was finally revealed on the floor of 
the Senate by Senator Sutherland of Oregon who was immediately 
denounced in the press as a pro-German. In time he was being com-
mended as a patriot, but the exposure came too late to save the 
Airplane Production Program which fell far short of expectations. 
This revelation did not undermine morale because most other gov-
ernment departments were reasonably successful. If, however, a 
government should suppress information concerning several such 
conditions and then have them burst forth one at a time, the con-
fidence of the people in the integrity and competence of their lead-
ers might be destroyed. 
In developing proper morale the government must consider not 
only the war but also the post-war period and of the two, the latter 
may well be the most difficult because the post-war period is not 
only largely unpredictable but also different. In the past, wars have 
been followed by booms and_ by depressions, by violent revolutions 
and by black reaction. They have also been followed by widespread 
political corruption and seldom by constructive political advance. 
Some people believe that one or more of the conditions just men-
tioned will follow the present war. Perhaps all of them will follow, 
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some being characteristic of one part of the world while others 
dominate in other lands. In the United States the Civil War was 
followed by political corruption and incapacity although the party 
that fought the war remained in power. After the first World War, 
on the other hand, the political party which fought the war was 
ousted but nevertheless a period of political corruption followed. 
During the first World War Creel succeeded very well at the head 
of the Committee on Public Information during the war period but 
not so well in preparing for the post-war period. Perhaps too much 
was promised resulting in disillusionment. Unfortunately some 
things were said which were untrue and the results are with us yet. 
It has apparently been difficult to convince many people that the 
Japanese have used Chinese prisoners of war for bayonet practice 
because they remember the untrue statements concerning Belgian 
children with their hands cut off. 
In the nature of things, the post-war period is bound to be diffi-
cult. Allies over whom we have slight or no control may prove to be 
too grasping as was the case of Japan after the last war. And fur-
ther, if unsound economic policies are employed by powerful gov-
ernments, no amount of morale building can ward off the inevitable 
consequences. 
In order to maintain the morale, the government must advocate 
sound aims for fighting the war. The people must be convinced not 
only that they are fighting in a just cause for adequate ends but 
also that the government is sincere in presenting these objectives 
and that it will not later be overruled by selfish, sinister groups 
either at home or abroad. President Wilson presented effective war 
aims in 1917 which helped greatly both at home and abroad in pi·o-
, moting victory. They were, however, phrased in such vague terms 
that later on trouble arose in applying them. Abraham Lincoln did 
extremely well in presenting the aims of our Civil War. 
Today, of course, we are faced with a more complex situation. 
No one, I think, believes that the ultimate objectives of such differ-
ent nations as Russia, China, the British Empire, and the United 
States are easy to reconcile. However, if the people are to fight with 
enthusiasm, the war aims of the Administration should possess sev-
eral characteristics. 
First, the people must be convinced that they are not fighting 
for selfish, imperialistic interests-either of our own country or of 
others. 
Second, they must also. feel that the war will be followed by a 
sincere and earnest attempt to create a more satisfactory world. 
Third, people must feel that they are fighting in a war which will 
bring definite, concrete advantages. It was possibly an error of judg-
ment of President Wilson in the First World War to announce that 
the United States would seek no advantage of any kind. Perhaps it 
would have been much better if he had demanded the bases from 
Newfoundland to Trinidad which President Roosevelt recently se-
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cured in exchange for fifty destroyers and if these bases had been 
immediately fortified for the protection of the country. Perhaps it 
would also have been better if he had demanded the bases in the 
lVIarshall Islands which were later turned over to Japan and which 
have now been used to attack us. Renunciation of selfish, imperial-
istic aims involving the conquest and subjugation of alien people is 
not necessarily irreconcilable with a desire to secure definite advan-
tages for one's country. 
Fourth, they must not promise the impossible. Otherwise post-
war disillusionment will be accentuated. 
Fifth, war aims must undermine enemy morale. 
Sixth, war aims must bind the allies together. 
Some of these aims are hard to reconcile. Merely to enumerate 
them indicates the difficult problem which an administration faces 
-the problem of setting forth war aims which will at the same time 
stiffen popular morale for the war period and provide a sound and 
workable program for a difficult and very different post war period. 
If the government is to maintain a high morale, there is no bet-
ter injunction than to quote the words of President Lincoln in ap-
pointing General Hooker to the command of the Army of the Poto-
mac, "God forward and give us victories." But the people must 
stand firm while victory is being prepared. That must involve a 
program of useful work for everyone. Only as everyone is personally 
a participant in useful work that contributes to victory will every-
one also feel the buoyant enthusiasm and confidence that is the 
essence of sound morale. 
MEASURING NATIONAL MORALE 
F. STUART CH,APIN 
University of Minnesota 
lVIorale has come to be a factor of prime importance in organiza-
tion for a total war. Time was when the civilian population re-
mained an inactive mass in war time, since professional soldiers 
alone conducted the fighting. Now the entire civilian population is 
harnessed to the war effort. The fighting forces are selected from 
the population by conscription, industrial workers are assigned to 
definite tasks in the production of military equipment and supplies, 
volunteers-women as well as men-are recruited for a variety of 
civilian defense services, prices and wages are subject to govern-
ment regulation, savings of surplus income are channelized into the 
purchase of war bonds, and income taxes reach down to the lower 
levels of earning. But all this regimentation of individual behavior 
is accompanied in a democracy with the necessity of keeping a 
highly literate people informed about the goals of the war effort and 
the current events that mark off steps toward achieving the goals. , 
